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UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM ON RINGS
FRE´DE´RIC MEUNIER, THOMAS PRADEAU
Abstract. We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific
costs. We are interested in the uniqueness property defined by Milchtaich [Milchtaich, I. 2005.
Topological conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium in networks. Math. Oper. Res. 30 225-244]
as the uniqueness of equilibrium flows for all assignments of strictly increasing cost functions. He
settled the case with two-terminal networks.
In the present work we characterize completely bidirectional rings for which the uniqueness
property holds. The main result is that it holds precisely for nine networks and those obtained
from them by elementary operations. For other bidirectional rings, we exhibit affine cost functions
yielding to two distinct equilibrium flows. Related results are also proven.
1. Introduction
In many areas, different users share a common network to travel or to exchange informations
or goods. Each user wishes to select a path connecting a certain origin to a certain destination.
However, the selection of paths in the network by the users induces congestion on the arcs, leading
to an increase of the costs. Taking into account the choices of the other users, each user looks for
a path of minimum cost. We expect therefore to reach a Nash equilibrium: each user makes the
best reply to the actions chosen by the other users.
This kind of games is studied since the 50’s, with the seminal works by Wardrop [War52] or
Beckman [BMW56]. When the users are assumed to be nonatomic – the effect of a single user is
negligible – equilibrium is known to exist [Mil00]. Moreover, when the users are affected equally by
the congestion on the arcs, the costs supported by the users are the same in all equilibria [AM81].
In the present paper, we are interested by the case when the users may be affected differently by
the congestion. In such a case, examples are known for which these costs are not unique. Various
conditions have been found that ensure nevertheless uniqueness. For instance, if the user’s cost
functions attached to the arcs are continuous, strictly increasing and identical up to additive con-
stants, then we have uniqueness of the equilibrium flows, and thus of the equilibrium costs [AK01].
In 2005, continuing a work initiated by Milchtaich [Mil00] and Konishi [Kon04] for networks with
parallel routes, Milchtaich [Mil05] found a topological characterization of two-terminal networks
for which, given any assignment of stricly increasing and continuous cost functions, the flows are
the same in all equilibria. Such networks are said to enjoy the uniqueness property.
The purpose of this paper is to find similar characterization for networks with more than two
terminals. We are able to characterize completely the ring networks having the uniqueness property,
whatever the number of terminals is. The main result is that it holds precisely for nine networks
and those obtained from them by elementary operations. For other rings, we exhibit affine cost
functions yielding to two distinct equilibrium flows. Related results are also proven. Following
Milchtaich, we show that the uniqueness property for these networks coincides generically with the
equivalence of all equilibria: if the users are split into a finite number of classes of users with the
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same features and if the cost functions are not linked by special relations, the contribution of each
class to the flow on each arc is the same in all equilibria.
2. Preliminaries on graphs
An undirected graph is a pair G = (V,E) where V is a finite set of vertices and E is a family of
unordered pairs of vertices called edges. A directed graph, or digraph for short, is a pair D = (V,A)
where V is a finite set of vertices and A is a family of ordered pairs of vertices called arcs. A mixed
graph is a graph having edges and arcs. More formally, it is a triple M = (V,E,A) where V is a
finite set of vertices, E is a family of unordered pairs of vertices (edges) and A is a family of ordered
pairs of vertices (arcs). Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), we define the directed version of
G as the digraph D = (V,A) obtained by replacing each (undirected) edge in E by two (directed)
arcs, one in each direction. An arc of G is then understood as an arc of its directed version. In
these graphs, loops – edge or arc having identical endpoints – are not allowed, but pairs of vertices
occuring more than once – parallel edges or parallel arcs – are allowed.
A walk in a directed graph D is a sequence
P = (v0, a1, v1, . . . , ak, vk)
where k ≥ 0, v0, v1, . . . , vk ∈ V , a1, . . . , ak ∈ A and ai = (vi−1, vi) for i = 1, . . . , k. If all vi are
distinct, the walk is called a path. If no confusion may arise, we identify sometimes a path P with
the set of its vertices or with the set of its arcs, allowing to use the notation v ∈ P (resp. a ∈ P )
if a vertex v (resp. an arc a) occurs in P .
An undirected graph G′ = (V ′, E′) is a subgraph of an undirected graph G = (V,E) if V ′ ⊆ V
and E′ ⊆ E. An undirected graph G′ is a minor of an undirected graph G if G′ is obtained by
contracting edges (possibly none) of a subgraph of G. Contracting an edge uv means deleting it
and identifying both endpoints u and v. Two undirected graphs are homeomorphic if they arise
from the same undirected graph by subdivision of edges, where a subdivision of an edge uv consists
in introducing a new vertex w and in replacing the edge uv by two new edges uw and wv.
The same notions hold for directed graphs and for mixed graphs.
Finally, let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph, and H = (T, L) be a directed graph with T ⊆ V ,
then G+H denotes the mixed graph (V,E, L).
3. Model
Similarly, as in the multiflow theory (see for instance [Sch03] or [KV00]), we are given a supply
graph G = (V,E) and a demand digraph H = (T, L) with T ⊆ V . The graph G models the
(transportation) network. The arcs of H model the origin-destination pairs, also called in the
sequel the OD-pairs. H is therefore assumed to be simple. A route is an (o, d)-path of the directed
version of G with (o, d) ∈ L and is called an (o, d)-route. The set of all routes (resp. (o, d)-routes)
is denoted by R (resp. R(o,d)).
The population of users is modelled as a bounded real interval I endowed with the Lebesgue
measure λ, the population measure. I is partitioned into measurable subsets I(o,d) with (o, d) ∈ L,
modelling the users wishing to select an (o, d)-route.
For a given pair of supply graph and demand digraph, we define the strategy profile by a mea-
surable mapping σ : I → R such that σ(i) ∈ R(o,d) for all i ∈ I(o,d) and (o, d) ∈ L. For each arc
a ∈ A of the directed version of G, the measure of the set of all users i such that a is in σ(i) is the
flow on a in σ and is denoted fa:
fa = λ{i ∈ I : a ∈ σ(i)}.
The cost of each arc a ∈ A for each user i ∈ I is given by a nonnegative, continuous and strictly
increasing cost function cia : R+ → R+, such that i 7→ c
i
a(x) is measurable for any a ∈ A and
2
x ∈ R+. When the flow on a is fa, the cost for user i of traversing a is c
i
a(fa). For user i, the cost
of a route r is defined as the sum of the costs of the arcs contained in r. A class is a set of users
having the same cost functions on all arcs.
The game we are interested in is defined by the supply graph G, the demand digraph H, the
population user set I and the cost functions cia for a ∈ A and i ∈ I. A strategy profile is a (pure)
Nash equilibrium if each route is only chosen by users for whom it is a minimal-cost route. In other
words, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if for each pair (o, d) ∈ L and each user i ∈ I(o,d) we
have ∑
a∈σ(i)
cia(fa) = min
r∈R(o,d)
∑
a∈r
cia(fa). (1)
Under the conditions stated above on the cost functions, a Nash equilibrium is always known to
exist. It can be proven similarly as Theorem 3.1 in [Mil00], or, as noted by Milchtaich [Mil05], it
can be deduced from more general results (Theorem 1 of [Sch70] or Theorems 1 and 2 of [Rat70]).
However, such an equilibrium is not necessarily unique, and even the equilibrium flows are not
necessarily unique.
4. Results
Milchtaich [Mil05] raised the question whether it is possible to characterize networks having the
uniqueness property, i.e. networks for which flows at equilibrium are unique. A pair (G,H) defined
as in Section 3 is said to have the uniqueness property if for any partition of I into measurable
subsets I(o,d) with (o, d) ∈ L, and for any assignment of (strictly increasing) cost functions, the flow
on each arc is the same in all equilibria.
Milchtaich found a positive answer for the two-terminal networks, i.e. when |L| = 1. More
precisely, he gave a (polynomial) characterization of a family of two-terminal undirected graphs
such that, for the directed versions of this family and for any assignment of (strictly increasing)
cost functions, the flow on each arc is the same in all equilibria. For two-terminal undirected graphs
outside this family, he gave explicit cost functions for which equilibria with different flows on some
arcs exist.
The objective of this paper is to address the uniqueness property for some networks having more
than two terminals, especially for ring networks. In a ring network, each user has exactly two
possible strategies. See Figure 1 for an illustration of this kind of supply graph G, demand digraph
H and mixed graph G+H. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that the supply graph G is a cycle. Then, for any demand digraph H, the pair
(G,H) has the uniqueness property if and only if each arc of G is contained in at most 2 routes.
Whether such a pair (G,H) of supply graph and demand digraph is such that each arc in
contained in at most 2 routes is obviously polynomially checkable, since we can test each arc one
after the other. We will show that it can actually be tested by making only one round trip, in any
direction.
Furthermore, we have the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. If the supply graph is a cycle and if there are at most two OD-pairs, i.e. |L| ≤ 2,
then the uniqueness property holds.
Corollary 2. If the supply graph is a cycle and if the uniqueness property holds, then the number
of OD-pairs is at most 4, i.e. |L| ≤ 4.
We are also able to describe such pairs (G,H) having the uniqueness property as the pairs such
that G+H is homeomorphic to a minor of one of nine mixed graphs, see Figures 2–5. Except for
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Figure 1. Example of a supply graph G, a demand digraph H, and the mixed
graph G+H.
the smallest one, none of the uniqueness property of these graphs can be derived from the result
by Milchtaich, even by adding fictitious vertices as suggested p.235 of his article [Mil05].
The organization of the remaining goes as follows. Section 5 is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.
Section 6 explores the nature of ring networks having each of their arcs in at most 2 routes. It
provides the whole list of such pairs (G,H). In this section, we also prove Corollaries 1 and 2
and explain how to compute the maximal number of routes containing an arc with only one round
trip. Section 7 contains complementary results. For instance, in Section 7.1, it is proven that
when the uniqueness property holds for such pairs, then we have a stronger result, namely that
the contribution of each class to the flows are generically unique (equivalence of the equilibria).
Section 7.3 focus on a strong uniqueness property that may hold for general graphs independently
of the demand digraph, i.e. of the OD-pairs.
5. Proof of the main result
5.1. Proof strategy and some preliminary results. The proof works in two steps. The first
step, Section 5.2, consists in proving Proposition 1 stating that when each arc is contained in
at most 2 routes, then the uniqueness property holds. The second step, Section 5.3, consists in
exhibiting cost functions for which flows at equilibrium are non-unique for any pair (G,H) with an
arc in at least 3 routes.
From now on, we assume that the cycleG is embedded in the plane. It allows to use an orientation
for G. Each route is now either clockwise, or counterclockwise. The same holds for arcs: we have
counterclockwise arcs and clockwise arcs.
Claim 1. For any (o, d) ∈ L, if a and a−1 are the two arcs stemming from a given edge e ∈ E,
then exactly one of a and a−1 is in an (o, d)-route.
Proof. Indeed, given an (o, d) ∈ L and an edge e ∈ E, exactly one of the counterclockwise and
clockwise (o, d)-routes contains e. 
The following notations will be useful for the proof of Theorem 1. For each user i, we define r+i
(resp. r−i ) to be the unique counterclockwise (resp. clockwise) route connecting the origin of i to
its destination. For any subset J ⊆ L, consider all counterclockwise (resp. clockwise) (o, d)-routes
with (o, d) ∈ J . Then A+J (resp. A
−
J ) is the set of counterclockwise (resp. clockwise) arcs contained
in all of these routes and no other. We define moreover AJ = A
+
J ∪ A
−
J . The sets AJ form a
partition of the set A of arcs of G.
On the example of Figure 1, we have for instance
A+{(o1,d1),(o2,d2)} = {(o2, v), (v, d1)}
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A−{(o2,d2)} = {(o2, o1)}
A∅ = {(d1, v), (v, o2), (d2, w), (w, u), (u, o1)}.
The sets AεJ enjoy three useful properties.
Claim 2. For any ε ∈ {−,+} and any (o, d) ∈ L, there is at least one J ⊆ L such that AεJ is
nonempty and (o, d) ∈ J .
Proof. Indeed, there is at least one arc of G on the (o, d)-route oriented according to ε. 
Claim 3. For any ε ∈ {−,+} and any J ⊆ L, we have
AεJ 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ A
−ε
J
6= ∅.
Proof. It is a consequence of Claim 1: if a ∈ AεJ , then a
−1 ∈ A−ε
J
. 
Claim 4. For any distinct ℓ and ℓ′ in L, there is at least one J such that |{ℓ, ℓ′} ∩ J | = 1 and
AJ 6= ∅.
Proof. Indeed, let ℓ = (o, d) and ℓ′ = (o′, d′) be two distinct OD-pairs of H. Since H is simple,
o 6= o′ or d 6= d′. It means that there is at least one arc of G which is in exactly one of the four
(o, d)- and (o′, d′)-routes. 
5.2. If each arc of G is contained in at most 2 routes, the uniqueness property holds.
For a strategy profile σ and a subset J ⊆ L, we define f+J and f
−
J to be:
f+J =
∫
i∈
⋃
ℓ∈J Iℓ
1{σ(i)=r+i }
dλ and f−J =
∫
i∈
⋃
ℓ∈J Iℓ
1{σ(i)=r−i }
dλ.
The quantity f+J (resp. f
−
J ) is thus the number of users i in a Iℓ with ℓ ∈ J choosing a counter-
clockwise (resp. clockwise) route. Note that the quantity f+J + f
−
J =
∑
ℓ∈J λ(Iℓ) does not depend
on the strategy σ.
Assume that we have two distinct equilibria σ and σˆ. The flows induced by σˆ are denoted with
a hat: fˆ . We define for any subset J ⊆ L:
∆J = f
+
J − fˆ
+
J = fˆ
−
J − f
−
J . (2)
By a slight abuse of notation, we let ∆ℓ := ∆{ℓ} for ℓ ∈ L. Note that for every subset J , J
′ ⊆ L
such that J ∩ J ′ = ∅, we have ∆J +∆J ′ = ∆J∪J ′ .
We have for each user i:
∑
J⊆L
δ(i)

 ∑
a∈A+
J
∩r+i
(cia(f
+
J )− c
i
a(fˆ
+
J ))−
∑
a∈A−
J
∩r−i
(cia(f
−
J )− c
i
a(fˆ
−
J ))

 ≤ 0. (3)
where δ(i) = 1{σ(i)=r+i }
− 1{σˆ(i)=r+i }
.
Indeed, as σ is an equilibrium we have∑
a∈A
cia(fa)
(
1{a∈σ(i)} − 1{a∈σˆ(i)}
)
≤ 0. (4)
For a ∈ A+J , we have fa = f
+
J and 1{a∈σ(i)} = 1{σ(i)=r+i }
1{a∈r+i }
, and the same holds for a ∈ A−J .
By decomposing the sum (4), we obtain that
∑
J⊆L

 ∑
a∈A+
J
∩r+i
cia(f
+
J )δ(i)−
∑
a∈A−
J
∩r−i
cia(f
−
J )δ(i)

 ≤ 0.
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We can write a similar equation for the equilibrium σˆ. Equation (3) is then obtained by summing
them.
As a consequence we get the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let ℓ ∈ L and i ∈ Iℓ such that δ(i) 6= 0. Then exactly one of the following alternatives
holds.
• There is a J ⊆ L with ℓ ∈ J , AJ 6= ∅ and δ(i)∆J < 0.
• For all J ⊆ L with ℓ ∈ J and AJ 6= ∅, we have ∆J = 0.
Proof. In Equation (3), if all terms of the sum are equal to 0, the second point of the statement
of the lemma holds: according to Equation (2) and using the fact that the maps cia are strictly
increasing,
∑
a∈A+
J
∩r+i
(cia(f
+
J ) − c
i
a(fˆ
+
J )) and −
∑
a∈A−
J
∩r−i
(cia(f
−
J ) − c
i
a(fˆ
−
J ) have same sign and
therefore are both equal to 0.
If at least one term of the sum is < 0, we get the first point in the statement of the lemma. 
With the help of this lemma, we get one direction of Theorem 1.
Proposition 1. If each arc of G is contained in at most 2 routes, the uniqueness property holds.
Proof. Note that the assumption of the proposition assures that AJ = ∅ if |J | ≥ 3.
Assume for a contradiction that there is a J0 such that ∆J0 6= 0 and AJ0 6= ∅. Then there is a
ℓ0 ∈ J0 such that ∆ℓ0 6= 0. At least one i0 ∈ Iℓ0 is such that δ(i0)∆ℓ0 > 0.
Suppose that the first case of Lemma 1 occurs. Then, there exists ℓ1 ∈ L, ℓ1 6= ℓ0 with A{ℓ0,ℓ1} 6= ∅
and δ(i0)∆{ℓ0,ℓ1} < 0. Then, δ(i0)(∆{ℓ0,ℓ1}) = δ(i0)(∆ℓ0 + ∆ℓ1) < 0, which implies that |∆ℓ0 | <
|∆ℓ1 |. It follows that ∆ℓ1 6= 0, and taking i1 ∈ Iℓ1 with δ(i1)∆ℓ1 > 0, only the first case of Lemma 1
can occur for i = i1 and ℓ = ℓ1. Indeed, the second case would imply that ∆{ℓ0,ℓ1} = 0 since
A{ℓ0,ℓ1} 6= ∅. Repeating the same argument, we build an infinite sequence (ℓ0, ℓ1, . . .) of elements
of L such that for each k ≥ 0, A{ℓk,ℓk+1} 6= ∅ and |∆ℓk | < |∆ℓk+1 |. This last condition implies that
the ℓk are distincts, which is impossible since |L| is finite.
Thus, the second case of Lemma 1 occurs for ℓ0, and then for any ℓ
′ ∈ L, ℓ′ 6= ℓ0, if A{ℓ0,ℓ′} 6= ∅,
then ∆{ℓ0,ℓ′} = 0. Since ∆ℓ0 6= 0, the lemma also gives that A{ℓ0} = ∅, and thus J0 6= {ℓ0}. We get
that J0 = {ℓ0, ℓ
′} for some ℓ′ ∈ L, and hence ∆J0 = 0, which is in contradiction with the starting
assumption. On any arc, we have a total flow that remains the same when changing from σ to
σˆ. 
5.3. If an arc of G is contained in at least 3 routes, a counterexample exists. We give an
explicit construction of multiple equilibria when an arc is contained in at least 3 routes.
5.3.1. If |L| = 3. In order to ease the notation, we use 1, 2 and 3 to denote the three OD-pairs
of H. We denote accordingly by I1, I2 and I3 the three sets of users associated to each of these
OD-pairs.
We can assume without loss of generality that A+{1,2,3} 6= ∅, A{1,2} 6= ∅ and A{1,3} 6= ∅. The first
assumption can be done since there is an arc in three routes. For the other ones: with the help of
Claim 4, and if necessary of Claim 3, we get that there is at least a J of cardinality 2 such that
AJ 6= ∅. Again, using Claim 4, this time with the two elements of J , and if necessary Claim 3, we
get another J ′ of cardinality 2 such that AJ ′ 6= ∅.
We define three classes of users. Each of these classes will be attached to one of the OD-pairs.
For a class k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we define also the following cost functions ck,εJ (x) for each arc according
to the set AεJ to which it belongs, with J ⊆ {1, 2, 3} and ε ∈ {−,+}. If the set does not exist, the
definition of ck,εJ (x) is simply discarded.
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Class 1: We define this class to be the users of the set I1. We set λ(I1) = 1.5, and choose
J1 ⊆ {1, 2, 3} with 1 ∈ J1 such that A
−
J1
6= ∅ (with the help of Claim 2).


c
1,+
{1,2,3}(x) =
24x+ 7
|A+{1,2,3}|
c
1,+
J (x) =
x
|A+J |
for any J 6= {1, 2, 3} with 1 ∈ J
c
1,−
J1
(x) =
x+ 48
|A−J1 |
c
1,−
J (x) =
x
|A−J |
for any J 6= J1 with 1 ∈ J .
Class 2: We define this class to be the users of the set I2. We set λ(I2) = 1. We have assumed
that A{1,2} 6= ∅. We distinguish hereafter the cases A
+
{1,2} 6= ∅ and A
−
{1,2} 6= ∅ (which may
hold simultaneously, in which case we make an arbitrary choice).
If A+{1,2} 6= ∅: We choose J2 ⊆ {1, 2, 3} with 2 ∈ J2 such that A
−
J2
6= ∅ (with the help of
Claim 2).


c
2,+
{1,2}(x) =
25x
|A+{1,2}|
c
2,+
J (x) =
x
|A+J |
for any J 6= {1, 2} with 2 ∈ J
c
2,−
J2
(x) =
x+ 31
|A−J2 |
c
2,−
J (x) =
x
|A−J |
for any J 6= J2 with 2 ∈ J .
If A−{1,2} 6= ∅:


c
2,+
{1,2,3}(x) =
x+ 26
|A+{1,2,3}|
c
2,+
J (x) =
x
|A+J |
for any J 6= {1, 2, 3} with 2 ∈ J
c
2,−
{1,2}(x) =
22x
|A−{1,2}|
c
2,−
J (x) =
x
|A−J |
for any J 6= {1, 2} with 2 ∈ J .
Class 3: We define this class to be the users of the set I3. We set λ(I3) = 1. We have assumed
that A{1,3} 6= ∅. We distinguish hereafter the cases A
+
{1,3} 6= ∅ and A
−
{1,3} 6= ∅ (which may
hold simultaneously, in which case we make an arbitrary choice).
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If A+{1,3} 6= ∅: We choose J3 ⊆ {1, 2, 3} with 3 ∈ J3 such that A
−
J3
6= ∅ (with the help of
Claim 2). 

c
3,+
{1,3}(x) =
25x
|A+{1,3}|
c
3,+
J (x) =
x
|A+J |
for any J 6= {1, 3} with 3 ∈ J
c
3,−
J3
(x) =
x+ 31
|A−J3 |
c
3,−
J (x) =
x
|A−J |
for any J 6= J3 with 3 ∈ J .
If A−{1,3} 6= ∅:

c
3,+
{1,2,3}(x) =
x+ 26
|A+{1,2,3}|
c
3,+
J (x) =
x
|A+J |
for any J 6= {1, 2, 3} with 3 ∈ J
c
3,−
{1,3}(x) =
22x
|A−{1,3}|
c
3,−
J (x) =
x
|A−J |
for any J 6= {1, 3} with 3 ∈ J .
We define now two strategy profiles σ and σˆ, inducing distinct flows on some arcs and we check
that each of them is an equilibrium.
σ: For all i ∈ I1, we set σ(i) = r
+
i and for all i ∈ I2 ∪ I3, we set σ(i) = r
−
i .
σˆ: For all i ∈ I1, we set σˆ(i) = r
−
i and for all i ∈ I2 ∪ I3, we set σˆ(i) = r
+
i .
For a class k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote with a slight abuse of notation the common counterclockwise
(resp. clockwise) route of the class k users by r+k (resp. r
−
k ).
Then for each strategy, the flows are the following:
For σ:
J {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
f+J 1.5 0 0 1.5 1.5 0 1.5
f−J 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
For σˆ:
J {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
fˆ+J 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
fˆ−J 1.5 0 0 1.5 1.5 0 1.5
We check now that σ and σˆ are equilibria, by computing the cost of each of the two possible
routes for each class. Since some AεJ may be empty, we get intervals, and those known to be
nonempty are used in the computation.
Class 1: We put in the Tables 1 and 2, the costs experienced by the class 1 users on the
various arcs of G for each of σ and σˆ. For a given J ⊆ {1, 2, 3} with 1 ∈ J , we indicate the
cost experienced by any class 1 user on the whole collection of arcs in AεJ , with ε ∈ {−,+}
according to the direction. For instance in σ, consider J = {1, 2, 3}, then f+J = 1.5, and
the cost of all arcs together in A+J is |A
+
J |c
1,+
J (1.5) = 43.
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ε = + ε = −
J with 1 ∈ J {1,2,3} other J1 other
f εJ 1.5 1.5 0 or 1 or 2 0 or 1 or 2
Cost on AεJ 43 1.5 48 or 49 or 50 0 or 1 or 2
Table 1. σ: flows and costs on the arcs of G for a class 1 user
Using the fact that A+{1,2,3} 6= ∅, the total cost of r
+
1 in σ for a class 1 user is equal to
43 + 1.5× (number of J 6= {1, 2, 3} such that A+J 6= ∅ and 1 ∈ J).
Since there are at most 3 sets J 6= {1, 2, 3} such that A+J 6= ∅, we get that the total cost
of r+1 lies in [43; 47.5]. Similarly, we get that the total cost of r
−
1 for a class 1 user lies in
[48; 54]. Therefore the users of class 1 are not incitated to change their choice in σ.
ε = + ε = −
J with 1 ∈ J {1,2,3} other J1 other
fˆ εJ 2 0 or 1 1.5 1.5
Cost on AεJ 55 0 or 1 49.5 1.5
Table 2. σˆ: flows and costs on the arcs of G for a class 1 user
In σˆ, the total cost of r+1 for a class 1 user lies in [55; 58] and the total cost of r
−
1 for a
class 1 user lies in [49.5; 54]. Therefore the users of class 1 are not incitated to change their
choice in σˆ.
Class 2: If A+{1,2} 6= ∅: We put in the Tables 3 and 4, the costs experienced by the class 2
users on the various arcs of G for each of σ and σˆ.
ε = + ε = −
J with 2 ∈ J {1,2} other J2 other
f εJ 1.5 0 or 1.5 1 or 2 1 or 2
Cost on AεJ 37.5 1.5 32 or 33 1 or 2
Table 3. σ: flows and costs on the arcs of G for a class 2 user
In σ, the total cost of r+2 for a class 2 user is precisely 39 (we use the fact that
A+{1,2,3} 6= ∅) and the total cost of r
−
2 lies in [32; 38]. The users of class 2 are not
incitated to change their choice in σ.
In σˆ, the total cost of r+2 for a class 2 user lies in [27; 30] and the total cost of r
−
2 lies
in [31; 35.5]. The users of class 2 are not incitated to change their choice in σˆ.
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ε = + ε = −
J with 2 ∈ J {1,2} other J2 other
fˆ εJ 1 1 or 2 0 or 1.5 0 or 1.5
Cost on AεJ 25 1 or 2 31 or 32.5 0 or 1.5
Table 4. σˆ: flows and costs on the arcs of G for a class 2 user
If A−{1,2} 6= ∅: We put in the Tables 5 and 6, the costs experienced by the class 2 users
on the various arcs of G for each of σ and σˆ.
In σ, the total cost of r+2 for a class 2 user lies in [27.5; 29] and the total cost of r
−
2 lies
in [22; 27]. The users of class 2 are not incitated to change their choice in σ.
ε = + ε = −
J with 2 ∈ J {1,2,3} other {1, 2} other
f εJ 1.5 0 or 1.5 1 1 or 2
Cost on AεJ 27.5 0 or 1.5 22 1 or 2
Table 5. σ: flows and costs on the arcs of G for a class 2 user
ε = + ε = −
J with 2 ∈ J {1,2,3} other {1, 2} other
fˆ εJ 2 1 or 2 1.5 0 or 1.5
Cost on AεJ 28 1 or 2 33 0 or 1.5
Table 6. σˆ: flows and costs on the arcs of G for a class 2 user
In σˆ, the total cost of r+2 for a class 2 user lies in [28; 32] and the total cost of r
−
2 lies
in [33; 34.5]. The users of class 2 are not incitated to change their choice in σˆ.
Class 3: The symmetry of the cost functions for classes 2 and 3 gives the same tables for class
3 as for class 2, by substituting {1, 3} to {1, 2}. Therefore, we get the same conclusions:
neither in σ, nor in σˆ, the class 3 users are incitated to change their choice.
We have proven that if there exists an arc in at least 3 routes and if |L| = 3, then the uniqueness
property does not hold. It remains to check the case when |L| > 3.
Remark. A classical question when there are several equilibria is whether one of them dominates
the others. An equilibrium is said to dominate another one if it is preferable for all users. In
this construction, no equilibrium dominates the other, except when A+{1,2,3} 6= ∅, A
−
{1,2} 6= ∅ and
A−{1,3} 6= ∅.
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Figure 2. All rings with |L| = 1 (i.e. 1 OD-pair) having the uniqueness property
are homeomorphic to this graph
Figure 3. All rings with |L| = 2 (i.e. 2 OD-pairs) having the uniqueness property
are homeomorphic to one or to minors of these graphs
5.3.2. If |L| > 3. Denote 1, 2, and 3 the three OD-pairs of H giving the three routes containing
the same arc of G. For these three arcs of H, we make the same construction as above, in the case
|L| = 3. For the other arcs of H, i.e. the other OD-pairs, we use a fourth class, whose costs are
very small on all counterclockwise arcs of G and very large on all clockwise arcs of G, and whose
measure is a small positive quantity δ. Each user of this class chooses always a counterclockwise
route, whatever the other users do. For δ small enough, the users of this class have no impact on
the choices of the users of the classes 1, 2, and 3, as the difference of cost between the routes is
always bounded below by 0.5.
6. Each arc of G in at most two routes
In this subsection, we provide a further combinatorial analysis of the characterization of the
uniqueness property stated in Theorem 1.
6.1. Corollaries 1 and 2. We first note that Corollary 1 is straightforward, and that Corollary 2
is a direct consequence of Claim 1: if |L| ≥ 5, then there is necessarily an arc of G in three routes.
6.2. How to compute in one round trip the maximal number of routes containing an
arc of G. In an arc (u, v), vertex u is called the tail and vertex v is called the head. We select any
tail of an arc in H. We make a round trip in an arbitrary direction, while maintaining in a list all
tails of arcs in H whose heads have not yet be encountered and while maintaining the minimum
and maximum sizes m and M reached by the list during the round trip. To take into account the
arcs of H whose tails are encoutered after their heads during the trip we add 1 to the current m
and M when such a tail is encountered.
At the end, max(|L| −m,M) is the maximal number of routes containing an arc of G (Claim 1).
6.3. Explicit description of the networks having the uniqueness property when the
supply graph is a cycle.
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Figure 4. All rings with |L| = 3 (i.e. 3 OD-pairs) having the uniqueness property
are homeomorphic to one or to minors of these graphs
Figure 5. All rings with |L| = 4 (i.e. 4 OD-pairs) having the uniqueness property
are homeomorphic to one or to minors of these graphs
Proposition 2. Let the supply graph G be a cycle. Then, for any demand digraph H, the pair
(G,H) is such that each arc of G is in at most 2 routes if and only if the mixed graph G + H is
homeomorphic to a minor of one of the nine mixed graphs of Figures 2–5.
Combined with Theorem 1, this proposition allows to describe explicitely all pairs (G,H) having
the uniqueness property, when G is a cycle.
Proof of Proposition 2. We can assume that V = T . As we have already noted, we can also assume
that |L| ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
If |L| ∈ {1, 2}, there is nothing to prove.
If |L| = 3, we can first assume that L contains two disjoint arcs that are crossing in the plane
embedding. By trying all possibilities for the third arc, we get that the only possible configuration
is the right one on Figure 4 and the ones obtained from it by edge contraction. Second, we assume
that there are no “crossing” arcs. The three heads of the arcs can not be consecutive on the cycle
otherwise we would have an arc of G in three routes. Again by enumerating all possibilities, we
get that the only possible configuration is the left one on Figure 4 and the ones obtained from it
by edge contraction.
If |L| = 4, Claim 1 shows that each arc of G belongs to exactly two routes. It implies that, in H,
the indegree of any ℓ ∈ L is at least 1 and the outdegree as well. There are therefore circuits in H.
It is straigtworward to check that it is impossible to have a length 3 circuit. It remains to enumerate
the possible cases for length 2 and length 4 circuits to get that the only possible configurations are
the ones of Figure 5 and the common one obtained from them by edge contraction. 
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7. Discussion
7.1. Equivalence of equilibria. Let us assume that we have a finite set K of classes. We denote
by Ikℓ the class k users of Iℓ and we assume that all I
k
ℓ are measurable.
Let σ and σˆ be two Nash equilibria. We define for an ℓ ∈ L, a class k and an arc a the quantity
fkℓ,a = λ{i ∈ I
k
ℓ : a ∈ σ(i)},
and
fˆkℓ,a = λ{i ∈ I
k
ℓ : a ∈ σˆ(i)}.
Following Milchtaich [Mil05], we say that the two equilibria are equivalent if not only the flow on
each arc is the same but the contribution of each pair and each class to the flow on each arc is the
same i.e. fkℓ,a = fˆ
k
ℓ,a for any arc a, OD-pair ℓ and class k. Milchtaich proved that a two-terminal
network has the uniqueness property if and only if every two Nash equilibria are equivalent for
generically all cost functions (Theorem 5.1 in [Mil05]). A property is considered generic if it holds
on an open dense set. “Open” and “dense” are understood according to the following metric on
the cost functions.
Define the set G of feasible assignment of cost functions: G contains all collections of continuous
and strictly increasing cost functions (cia)a∈A,i∈I with c
i
a : R+ → R+ such that, for all ℓ ∈ L and
for all class k, whenever i, i′ ∈ Ikℓ , then c
i
a = c
i′
a .
Given a particular element of G, the function i 7→ cia(x) is measurable for all a ∈ A and x ∈ R+.
Every element of G has therefore a nonempty set of Nash equilibria. Note that the set G depends
on the partition of the population. We can define the distance between two elements (cia)a∈A,i∈I
and (cˆia)a∈A,i∈I of G by max |c
i
a(x)− cˆ
i
a(x)|, where the maximum is taken over all a ∈ A, i ∈ I and
x ∈ R+. This defines a metric for G.
Theorem 2. Assume that the supply graph G is a cycle. Then, for any demand digraph H, the
following assertions are equivalent:
(i) (G,H) has the uniqueness property.
(ii) For every partition of the population, there is an open dense set in G such that for any
assignment of cost functions that belongs to this set, every two equilibria are equivalent.
Sketch of proof. Up to slight adaptations, the proof is the same as the one of Theorem 5.1 in [Mil05].
If (i) does not hold, we can use the construction of Section 5.3 to build two strict equilibria for
an assignment in G. In a ball centered on this assignment with radius ρ > 0 small enough, we still
have two equilibria with distinct flows, which can not be equivalent. Therefore (ii) does not hold
either.
If (i) holds, three claims (Claims 1, 2 and 4 of [Mil05]) lead to the desired conclusion, namely
that (ii) holds. These three claims are now sketched. Their original proof does not need to be
adapted, except for the second one, which is the only moment where the topology of the network
is used. Its proof in our case is in fact simpler.
For an assignment in G, we denote φkℓ the number of minimal-cost routes for users in I
k
ℓ , which is
in our case 1 or 2. Since the uniqueness property is assumed to hold, this number is fully determined
by the assignment in G. Define the mean number of minimal-cost routes
φ =
∑
k∈K,ℓ∈L
λ(Ikℓ )φ
k
ℓ .
The first claim states that the map φ : G → R is upper semicontinuous and has finite range.
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The second claim states that for every assignment of cost functions in G that is a point of
continuity of φ, all Nash equilibria are equivalent. To prove this second claim, we consider two
Nash equilibria assumed to be nonequivalent σ and σˆ. Using these two equilibria, a new one is
built, σ˜, such that fkℓ,r1 > 0, fˆ
k
ℓ,r1
> 0 and f˜kℓ,r1 = 0 for some ℓ ∈ L, some class k and some ℓ-route
r1. As the two ℓ-routes do not share any arc (Claim 1), for any a in r1, we have f
k
ℓ,a > 0, fˆ
k
ℓ,a > 0,
and f˜kℓ,a = 0.
The second claim is achieved by choosing any a1 in r1 and by adding any small value δ > 0 to
the cost function cia1 for i ∈ I
k
ℓ , while keeping the others unchanged. It can be checked that the set
of minimal-cost routes is the same as for δ = 0, minus the route r1 for users in I
k
ℓ . The map φ has
therefore a discontinuity of at least λ(Ikℓ ) at the original assignment of cost functions.
Finally, the third claim allows to conclude: in every metric space, the set of all points of continuity
of a real-valued upper semicontinuous function with finite range is open and dense. 
7.2. Results for more general graphs. The following proposition formalizes the fact that for
general graphs, the uniqueness property is kept whenever one “glues” together two supply graphs
on a vertex. This latter operation is called a 1-sum in the usual terminology of graphs. Since it is
an elementary result, we state it without proof.
Proposition 3. Let G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E′) be two graphs, and let H = (T, L) and H ′ =
(T ′, L′) two directed graphs with T ⊆ V and T ′ ⊆ V ′, such that (G,H) and (G′, H ′) have the
uniqueness property. Assume that V ∩ V ′ = T ∩ T ′ is reduced to a unique vertex v and define
G′′ = (V ∪V ′, E∪E′) and H ′′ = (T∪T ′, L∪L′∪L′′) with L′′ := {(u,w) : (u, v) ∈ L and (v, w) ∈ L′}.
Then (G′′, H ′′) as the uniqueness property.
7.3. The strong uniqueness property. A supply graph is said to have the strong uniqueness
property if for any choice of the OD-pairs, the uniqueness property holds. In other words, G = (V,E)
has the strong uniqueness property if, for any digraph H = (T, L) with T ⊆ V , the pair (G,H) has
the uniqueness property.
Theorem 3. A graph has the strong uniqueness property if and only if no cycle is of length 3 or
more.
A graph has the strong uniqueness property if and only it is obtained by taking a forest (a graph
without cycles) and by replacing some edges by parallel edges.
Proof of Theorem 3. If there is a cycle of length 3, there exists a H such that an arc of G is in three
routes, see Figure 6. With the help of Theorem 1, we see that multiple equilibria with distinct
flows on some arcs exist for some cost functions.
If not, Proposition 3 applied on graphs reduced to parallel edges leads to the desired conclusion.
We use here the fact that graphs reduced to parallel edges have the strong uniqueness property,
see [Kon04] or [Mil05]. 
7.4. When there are only two classes. When exhibiting multiple equilibrium flows in the
proof of Theorem 1, the number of classes is always at least three. The same remark holds for
the characterization of the two-terminal networks having the uniqueness property in the article
by Milchtaich [Mil05]: all cases of non-uniqueness are built with three classes. We may wonder
whether there are also multiple equilibrium flows with only two classes of users. The answer is yes
as shown by the following examples. The first example is in the framework of the ring network;
according to Theorem 1, such an example requires at least 3 OD-pairs. Since it will contain exactly
3 OD-pairs, it is in a sense a minimum example for ring network. The second example involves a
two-terminal network. It is inspired by the work by Bashkar et al. [BFHH09].
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Figure 6. A cycle of length 3 without the uniqueness property: arc (u, v) is in three routes
7.4.1. Multiple equilibrium flows on the ring with only two classes. Consider the network of Figure 6,
and use the construction as in Section 5.3.
There are two classes 1 and 2, with the following population measures.
ℓ ∈ L (u,w) (u, v) (w, v)
λ(I1ℓ ) 1 0 1
λ(I2ℓ ) 0 1.5 0
Cost functions are
Arcs of G (u,w) (w, v) (v, u) (w, u) (u, v) (v, w)
Class 1 22x 22x x x+ 26 x
Class 2 x x+ 48 24x+ 7
We define the strategy profile σ (resp. σˆ) such that all users of the class 1 select a counterclockwise
(resp. clockwise) route and all users of the class 2 select a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) route.
We get the following (distinct) flows.
Arcs a of G (u,w) (w, v) (v, u) (w, u) (u, v) (v, w)
fa 1 1 0 0 1.5 0
fˆa 1.5 1.5 0 1 2 1
We check that σ is an equilibrium.
For users in I1(u,w) and in I
1
(w,v), the cost of the counterclockwise route is 22 and of the clockwise
27.5. For users in I2(u,v), the cost of the counterclockwise route is 50 and of the clockwise 43.
No user is incitated to change its route choice.
We check that σˆ is an equilibrium.
For users in I1(u,w) and in I
1
(w,v), the cost of the counterclockwise route is 33 and of the clockwise
29. For users in I2(u,v), the cost of the counterclockwise route is 51 and of the clockwise 55.
No user is incitated to change its route choice.
7.4.2. Multiple equilibrium flows for a two-terminal network with only two classes. Consider the
two-terminal network K4 of Figure 7.
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Figure 7. A two-terminal network for which multiple equilibrium flows exist with
only two classes
Suppose that we have two classes of nonatomic users I1 and I2, with λ(I1) = 3 and λ(I2) = 4,
with the following cost functions on each arc, where “∞” means a prohibitive high cost function.
Arcs of G (o, u) (o, v) (u, v) (v, u) (u, d) (v, d) (o, d)
Class 1 x “∞” x+ 18 “∞” “∞” x 7x
Class 2 5x x “∞” “∞” x 5x x+ 10
Users of class 1 have only the choice between the two routes ouvd and od, while users of class 2
can choose between the three routes oud, ovd and od.
The strategy profile σ is defined such that all class 1 users select the route ouvd and all class 2
users select the route od.
The strategy profile σˆ is defined such that all class 1 users select the route od, half of class 2
users select the route oud and the other half select the route ovd. We get the following (distinct)
flows.
Arcs a of G (o, u) (o, v) (u, v) (v, u) (u, d) (v, d) (o, d)
fa 3 0 3 0 0 3 4
fˆa 2 2 0 0 2 2 3
We check that σ is an equilibrium.
For users of the class 1, the cost of ouvd is 27 and the cost of od is 28. For users of the class 2,
the cost of oud is 15, the cost of ovd is 15 and the cost of od is 14.
No user is incitated to change its route choice.
We check that σˆ is an equilibrium.
For users of the class 1, the cost of ouvd is 22 and the cost of od is 21. For users of the class 2,
the cost of oud is 12, the cost of ovd is 12 and the cost of od is 13.
No user is incitated to change its route choice.
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